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This investigation examined whether impairment in configural processing could 
explain deficits in face emotion recognition in people with Parkinson’s disease (PD). 
Stimuli from the Radboud Faces Database were used to compare recognition of four 
negative emotion expressions by older adults with PD (n=16) and matched controls 
(n=17). Participants were tasked with categorising emotional expressions from 
upright and inverted whole faces and facial composites; it is difficult to derive 
configural information from these two types of stimuli so featural processing should 
play a larger than usual role in accurate recognition of emotional expressions. We 
found that the PD group were impaired relative to controls in recognising anger, 
disgust and fearful expressions in upright faces. Then, consistent with a configural 
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processing deficit, participants with PD showed no composite effect when attempting 
to identify facial expressions of anger, disgust and fear. A face inversion effect, 
however, was observed in the performance of all participants in both the whole faces 
and facial composites tasks. These findings can be explained in terms of a configural 
processing deficit if it is assumed that the disruption caused by facial composites 
was specific to configural processing, whereas inversion reduced performance by 
making it difficult to derive both featural and configural information from faces. 
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UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF CONFIGURAL PROCESSING IN 
FACE EMOTION RECOGNITION IN PARKINSON’S DISEASE  
 
Introduction 
Effortless face processing is an evolved skill that is important throughout the lifespan 
for social competence. The ability we have for rapid recognition of facial identity and 
emotional expression has triggered much research towards understanding the 
complexity of face processing mechanisms. While there are outstanding questions 
(Dobs, Isik, Pantazis, & Kanwisher, 2019; Young & Burton, 2018), there is good 
comprehension of processes involved in accurate identity recognition. In contrast, 
there remain gaps in understanding the contribution of underlying perceptual 
mechanisms to accurate emotion recognition (Bombari et al., 2013; Meaux & 
Vuilleumier, 2016) despite a degree of shared processing pathways in the early 
stages of facial identity and emotion recognition (Connolly, Young, & Lewis, 2018). 
Some insight into underlying mechanisms of interpreting facial expressions can be 
gleaned from comparison studies of groups with and without impairment in face 
emotion recognition. One such group with a deficit in face emotion recognition is 
people with Parkinson’s disease (Argaud, Vérin, Sauleau, & Grandjean, 2018).  
Parkinson’s disease (PD) is primarily a disorder of later life. The major 
manifestation is progressive disturbance in motor function caused by dopaminergic 
cell loss in the substantia nigra, which projects to the striatum, with formation of 
Lewy bodies (Bradshaw & Mattingley, 1995). During the course of this progressive 
disease damage extends from the nigrostriatal system to many other regions; and 
although the classic triad of tremor, rigidity and bradykinaesia remains the hallmark 
of the disease first described by Parkinson (1817), various forms of cognitive 
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impairment become manifest, even in those who are newly diagnosed (Baggio et al., 
2012). One of these cognitive deficits is impaired face perception and memory 
(Cousins, Hanley, Davies, Turnbull, & Playfer, 2000), and in recognising emotional 
expressions (Argaud et al., 2018; Baggio et al., 2012; Narmé, Bonnet, Dubois, & 
Chaby, 2011; Péron, Dondaine, Le Jeune, Grandjean, & Vérin, 2012).  
Whilst contradictory results pervade the literature regarding the extent of 
impairment in face emotion recognition in people with Parkinson’s, Péron et al.’s 
systematic review of 43 published studies examining emotion processing in PD 
patients concluded that impairment is greater for negative emotions – anger, disgust, 
fear and sadness – than relatively positive emotions – happiness and surprise 
(Péron et al., 2012). This can be understood, they argued, pathophysiologically 
through disruption to normal functional involvement of dopaminergic pathways and 
the basal ganglia. More lately, this lab extended their review to 97 studies comparing 
facial emotion recognition in individuals with PD and controls (Argaud et al., 2018). 
They suggested that the origins of inconsistencies in the literature are at least partly 
explained by variations in methodology and they raised the question of whether the 
sensitivity of some tasks that have been used was sufficient to reveal impairments. 
Critically, however, this review concluded that there was strong evidence of an 
overall deficit in facial emotion recognition in PD, and that this deficit was greatest for 
the negative emotions.  
Both individual facial features (i.e. eyes, nose and mouth) and the spatial 
relationship between these features are important in recognising faces (Carey & 
Diamond, 1977; Rakover, 2002; Tanaka & Simonyi, 2016). The literature presents 
evidence supporting holistic, configural processing of whole, upright faces occurring 
automatically, which enables almost instant overall recognition of a face at the 
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expense of attention to face parts (Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Thompson, 1980). 
Originally the description of a face as providing ‘configural information’ was used by 
Carey and Diamond (1977) simply to refer to the layout or positioning of the features 
of a face. Later, these authors (Diamond & Carey, 1986) described two types of 
configural information: “first order relational properties” (p.110) which referred to the 
basic layout of features that distinguishes a face from other stimuli, and is common 
to all faces (i.e., two eyes above a nose, which is above a mouth); and “second order 
relational properties” (p.110) which refer to the subtle differences in spacing and 
feature size and shape which allows a face to be distinguished from other faces. 
Subsequently, it has been proposed (Maurer, Le Grand, & Mondloch, 2002) that 
there are three components that underpin configural processing. Similar to Diamond 
and Carey (1986), Maurer et al., (2002) distinguish between “sensitivity to first-order 
relations” (p.255): detection of face-like relations in stimuli; and “sensitivity to 
second-order relations” (p.255) referring to perceived variations in internal features 
and spacing. However they also claim that detection of face first-order relations is on 
the basis of holistic processing utilizing Gestalt principles of closure, and that it is this 
immediate processing response that undermines processing of individual features of 
a face that comes into view.  
Upright face processing has great evolutionary importance and, in practice, an 
obligatory skill for most people (Cousins, 2013). This is the natural orientation, and 
many experimental studies have convincingly confirmed findings that when a face is 
presented upside-down, recognition is seriously disrupted (e.g., Rossion, 2008; 
Valentine, 1988; Yin, 1969). The Face Inversion Effect (FIE), as it is known, refers to 
the substantial decrease in recognition ability when a face is not presented in the 
upright orientation. Understanding this phenomenon has been the subject of much 
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investigation, and whilst not fully understood, there is some consensus that the FIE 
has a perceptual basis underpinned by disruption to the normal ability to holistically 
process face relational information (Richler, Mack, Palmeri, & Gauthier, 2011; 
Rossion, 2008). 
Cousins et al. (2000) examined the possibility that face memory problems 
seen in people with PD are the result of impairment in configural processing using an 
adaptation of Mooney’s Face Closure Test (Mooney, 1957). 40 black and white 
drawings of human faces which disclosed only the salient highlights or shadows 
were presented upright as target closure items or inverted as distractors. The test 
required participants to first determine whether the given stimulus was a face, then if 
so, to reveal guessing, participants were asked to identify age group (young, adult, 
old), and sex (male or female). Even though the stimuli provide only “a confused or 
incomplete configuration” (p.157), Mooney’s faces are recognised immediately 
(Schwiedrzik, Melloni, & Schurger, 2018) by neurotypical individuals. Cousins et al. 
however, found their PD group had significantly greater difficulty performing this task 
than a control group. Later, on the basis that some of the early perceptual processes 
required for the structural encoding faces are involved in both identity and emotion 
recognition, Narmé et al. (2011) suggested that this configural processing 
impairment may also explain deficits in face emotion recognition in PD.  
Narmé et al. (2011) compared the performance of 12 non-dementing, fully 
medicated Parkinson’s patients and 10 controls on an emotion recognition task. Ten 
Ekman faces representing four basic emotions: happiness, fear, disgust, anger, as 
well as a neutral expression (50 photographs) were presented both upright and 
inverted. Narmé et al.’s procedure was that images remained on screen until the 
participant selected one of the five emotion expression labels. They found that for 
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upright faces their PD group were less accurate than their control group, and for 
inverted faces there was no difference in performance between the two groups. They 
also reported a significantly larger effect of inversion in the controls than in the PD 
group. Consistent with the view that the processing of inverted faces depends on 
featural processing, similar performance by the two groups was taken as support for 
their hypothesis. That is, featural processing ability was normal in the PD group, and 
an impairment in configural processing was responsible for the observed emotion 
recognition deficits.  
Narmé et al. (2011) based their assertion on pooled data from four emotions. 
If there was a difference in reliance on configural processing according to emotion, 
then this may have been an inappropriate conclusion. Narmé et al. reported 
happiness judgements at ceiling (99% accurate), and for upright faces, the PD group 
were significantly impaired compared to their controls only in classifying anger. This 
means they were unable to replicate previous findings of impairment in recognition of 
fear and disgust in their PD sample (c.f., Argaud et al. 2018; Péron et al., 2012). 
Support for Narmé et al.’s conclusion then, is relatively weak, indicating a need to 
replicate their study, including an examination of the impact of configural processing 
disruption on recognition of negative face expressions separately.  
Alonso-Recio, Martín, Rubio, and Serrano (2014) used two types of task to 
examine the role of configural processing in facial emotion recognition in PD. They 
used a discrimination task – in which participants had to decide whether two faces 
displayed “same” or “different” emotions (anger, disgust, fear, sadness or happiness 
from FACES Database) – and a categorisation task, in which participants had to 
decide which emotion a face showed. The natural coloured face stimuli were 
displayed until a response was made or for up to 10 seconds. They found no 
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difference between people with PD and controls in the discrimination task, but the 
performance of the Parkinson’s group was significantly poorer than the control group 
on the categorisation task. Alonso-Recio et al. suggested that good performance on 
the discrimination task indicated that the use of configural processes in facial 
emotion recognition by patients with PD is not globally impaired. This claim rests on 
the assumption that both tasks required some form of configural processing. Such an 
interpretation can, however, be contested (e.g. De Haan & Nelson, 1998). Instead, it 
may be the case that the discrimination task was more sensitive to a comparison of 
facial features while the categorisation task was more sensitive to configural 
processing. The main results of the study were derived from pooled face emotions 
data. The authors also provided information on correct categorisation of the five 
emotions separately. These differed according to target emotion. As with Narmé et 
al. (2011) means were highest for happy and lowest for anger. Altogether, Alonso-
Recio et al.’s findings are not necessarily inconsistent with the view that poor 
emotion recognition in PD is caused by a configural processing deficit. 
Argaud et al. (2018) discussed differences in recognition performance among 
emotions in PD. We suggest these differences can be attributed to the role of 
configural processing in achieving recognition of an emotional expression. That is, 
differences in findings between emotions may be a result of some emotions being 
more reliant upon configural processing (McKelvie, 1995; Prkachin, 2003). McKelvie 
(1995) examined the performance of undergraduate students on recognition of 
emotion expressions in upright and inverted faces. He found that their ability to 
recognise facial expressions was not completely lost with inversion, and that the 
negative effect of inversion varied across the six basic emotional expressions he 
used. McKelvie argued that the difference accorded to dependency of the specific 
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emotion on configural information for identification. He found virtually no impact of 
inversion on happy expressions, in contrast to significant misidentification of sadness 
and anger expressions. Prkachin (2003) similarly found negative emotions to be 
more reliant on configural processing for recognition with a greater effect of inversion 
for anger and fear, than for disgust; sadness was intermediate. Critically, she 
concluded that a more intense search of both eye and mouth regions is required for 
identification of anger, disgust, fear and sadness expressions than other 
expressions. That is, these studies suggest that the demands of configural 
processing vary across emotion expression in the face, and this may underpin the 
selective deficits in emotion expression recognition seen in PD. 
Face inversion is generally defined as a rotation of a face through 180o so that 
it is upside down. There is no change to either features or configuration. This has 
raised various explanations of how this manipulation prevents instant recognition. 
Relevant to this exploration, Diamond and Carey (1986) argued that the detrimental 
effects of inversion are confined to configural processing. Much evidence is 
consistent with disruption to configural processing (see Rakover, 2013 for review). 
However, there is also accumulating evidence that inversion does not spare featural, 
part-based processing of faces, as has generally been assumed. Some of the most 
convincing evidence that facial features are vulnerable to the effects of inversion was 
provided by Psalta, Young, Thompson, and Andrews (2014). Their study examined 
the effects of inversion on the processing of grotesque Thatcherised faces. Psalta et 
al. pointed out that the inability to perceive grotesque expressions in inverted 
Thatcherised faces has generally been attributed to the disruption of 2nd order 
relations by inversion. However, in their study, the ability to detect a grotesque 
feature was disrupted by inversion even when only the mouth region of a 
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Thatcherised face was presented. Psalta et al. suggested that the Thatcher illusion is 
best explained in terms of inversion reducing sensitivity to the perception of facial 
features. But if inversion affects featural processing, then it is perhaps surprising that 
Narmé et al.’s (2011) PD sample showed such a small effect of facial inversion. If 
individuals with PD rely on featural processing, and if featural processing is disrupted 
by inversion, then it would be expected that individuals with Parkinson’s disease 
confirm a substantial inversion effect when attempting to recognise facial 
expressions. Moreover, there are also doubts as to whether inversion abolishes 
configural processing. For example, Rivest, Moscovitch, and Black (2009) argued 
that is possible to access some configural information from a face even when it is 
inverted. So, if controls can access some configural information from an inverted 
face, then they would be expected to out-perform individuals who suffer from a 
configural processing deficit. Inversion, therefore, may not provide a particularly 
sensitive way of investigating whether individuals with Parkinson’s disease have a 
configural processing impairment.  
Consequently, our study used an additional task to investigate this issue 
further; individuals with Parkinson’s disease were asked to identify emotional 
expressions from facial composites. In the composite paradigm (Young, Hellawell, & 
Hay, 1987), faces of individuals are divided to form a top and a bottom half. The 
halves from two different individuals can be aligned together. Under these 
circumstances, the identity of the person in the top or bottom half of the composite is 
recognised more slowly and less accurately than when the two segments are non-
aligned – that is, the top half and bottom half of a face do not line up, and the mouth 
could be under an ear. It appears that configural processing fuses the two halves of 
aligned composites into a novel Gestalt that interferes with recognition from the top 
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or bottom half of the face. The composite paradigm demonstrates the challenge of 
attending to just a part of a face in the context of a whole face, thereby revealing the 
significance of configural processing in face recognition. 
Although originally developed to examine identity recognition, there have 
since been various iterations of the face composite effect methodology. Calder, 
Keane, Young, and Dean (2000) presented composites in which the top and bottom 
halves showed the same person’s face displaying two different emotions. The task 
was to identify the emotion being displayed in either the top or bottom half of the 
composite. The composites were aligned on some trials and non-aligned on others. 
Calder et al. (2000) found a composite effect in both facial emotion recognition and 
facial identity tasks in their sample of 12 young participants; accuracy was lower, and 
reaction times were higher in the aligned condition compared to the nonaligned 
condition. Poorer performance in the aligned condition was attributed to a difficulty in 
ignoring ‘irrelevant’ information about expression from the facial composite. If 
individuals with Parkinson’s disease are impaired at configural processing then it 
would follow that, when judging the emotion associated with the top half of a 
composite, they would be less likely than controls to suffer interference from the 
bottom half when it is displaying a different emotion (and vice versa). We would 
therefore expect to observe relatively good performance in the PD sample when 
processing aligned composites leading to a reduced or abolished facial composite 
effect.  
In summary, this study sought to explain why individuals with Parkinson’s 
disease are impaired at judging emotional expressions from faces. To examine the 
role of configural processing in emotion recognition we used anger, disgust, fear, 
and sadness face stimuli both to reflect the PD literature (Péron et al., 2012; Argaud 
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et al., 2018), and because these emotion expressions may be more dependent upon 
configural processing (Prkachin, 2003). The study investigated whether a PD group 
would show a significantly smaller facial composite effect than controls. It also 
sought to replicate previous findings that expression decisions in individuals with 
Parkinson’s disease are relatively insensitive to the effects of facial inversion. 
Specifically, we hypothesised: 
1. Controls will perform significantly better in upright whole face emotion recognition 
than people with Parkinson’s.  
2. There will be no Face Inversion Effect (FIE) in the Parkinson’s group.  
3. Controls will have significantly better face emotion recognition for non-aligned 
composite faces than for aligned composite faces. 




Ethical approval for the study protocol was granted by a National Health Service 
Health Research Authority National Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Design 
We used a prospective ex post facto study with an interparticipant independent 
variable: Group (PD and Control Group) and two intraparticipant independent 
variables: compositive (aligned and non-aligned) and composite faces (upright and 
upside-down). Dependent variables were accuracy and the recognition of emotion 
expression. 
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Participants 
A purposeful sampling technique (Bowling, 2014) of people with confirmed PD with a 
range of age, disability, and disease duration was employed. Participants were 
excluded from the experimental sample if they also had a diagnosis of concomitant 
dementia or any other neurological condition in conjunction with PD. 18 people with 
idiopathic PD and 18 controls matched for age and current verbal intelligence at time 
of testing consented to take part. No payment was made to any participant. All 
participants were Caucasian and lived in North-West England. Two participants (one 
PD, one control) were not recruited following screening for compromised cognition, 
and one PD participant withdrew during testing. The final sample therefore contained 
16 people with PD and 17 controls. Sample size calculations are sensitive to error 
and complicated when drawing upon incomplete information in the literature 
(Noordzij et al., 2010). This sample size was calculated to be sufficient at an alpha of 
0.05 and a power of .80, to test for a difference between the PD group and a 
matched control group based on previous published research output, particularly that 
of Narmé et al. (2011), whose research we were replicating and extending. Narmé et 
al. (2011) found relevant significant differences in emotion expression recognition 
between groups of twelve people with PD and ten controls. 
Table 1 contains details of the demographics of the sample. 
______________________ 
Insert Table 1 here 
______________________ 
The PD group were all receiving dopaminergic medication at the time of 
testing (14/16 were taking levodopa preparations, 11/14 were also taking dopamine 
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boosting drugs; 2/16 were taking dopamine agonists only); none were distracted by 
tremor or drug-induced dyskinaesias during the testing session.  
The control group comprised people without neurological illness who were 
similar in age and background to the case sample. Family caregivers were recruited 
where possible with additional purposive recruitment from healthy volunteers known 
to the researchers. 
There was no statistical difference between the PD patients and the controls 
in terms of age or current verbal intelligence as assessed by the Mill Hill Vocabulary 
Test (Raven, 1943). The Mill Hill test investigates knowledge of up to 17 target words 
that progress in difficulty. Participants are asked to select the best synonym from a 
choice of six words that accompany a given target word. Most participants were 
willing and able to guess from alternatives if they did not immediately know the target 
word, and they were not disabused of any errors. After three successive errors, the 
test was terminated.  
No attempt was made to match the two groups using a test of nonverbal 
intelligence. As previously reported (Cousins et al., 2000), tests of non-verbal 
intelligence disadvantage people with Parkinson’s because of these tests rely on 
visual closure. In an investigation such as this, there would therefore be a risk of 
contaminating dependent variables if a non-verbal test were used to match 
participants.  
No attempt was made to match the two groups for depression even though 
depression is frequently a co-morbid condition for Parkinson’s patients (Schrag et al., 
2007). PD samples are generally more depressed than healthy control samples, but 
severity is usually classified as “mild” (Mayeux, 1981). Lees (1990) cautions that 
some symptoms of PD provide opportunity for misdiagnosis of depression, that in 
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most patients with depression, it is relatively mild, and psychotic depression occurs 
in less than 10% of cases. In their review of use of depression rating scales used in 
PD, Schrag et al. (2007) discuss problems with using depression rating scales in PD, 
and note that the typical inclusion of somatic items can unduly inflate scores, and 
inappropriately “influence the results of treatment trials of depression in PD” (p1087). 
We proceeded by ascertaining full medication intake of all participants, with a view to 
excluding any participant with a history of clinical depression. We included two 
participants with PD and one Control participant who were currently taking a low 




The faces of 10 Caucasian people (5 male) were selected from the Radboud Faces 
Database (Langner et al., 2010). Four natural colour photographs of each face were 
used, making a total of 40 photographs. Each photograph displayed one of four 
basic emotions – anger, disgust, fear, sadness – described by Ekman and Friesen 
(1975). That is, for ‘anger’, the eyes were bulging and the lips were pursed; for 
‘disgust’ the nose bridge was wrinkled, the cheeks were raised and the upper lip was 
raised; the ‘fear’ expression was distinguished by wide open eyes, raised brows and 
an open mouth; and in the ‘sadness’ expression the eyes were framed by raised 
inner brows and the corners of the mouth were lowered.  
For the composite stimuli, the 40 photographs were cut horizontally across the 
middle of the face, directly under the nose so that the eyes and the mouth were in 
separate parts: the eyes and the mouth are most important for expression 
recognition (Tanaka & Simonyi, 2016). Composites were made from the same 
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models for 12 different eyes/mouth emotion combinations: anger/disgust, anger/fear, 
anger/sadness; disgust/anger, disgust/fear, disgust/sadness; fear/anger, 
fear/disgust, fear/sadness; sadness/anger, sadness/disgust, sadness/fear. The 
aligned composites were edited where necessary – using Adobe Photoshop – to 
occlude differences in shade, and ensure there were no gaps, or sharp edges at the 
jawline or on the nose. Non-aligned composites were made following the principle of 
moving the top half to the left or to the right until the model’s jawline was directly 
under the middle or the nose, and with no gap between the two parts. Examples of 
the face stimuli are presented in Figures 1, 2, and 3. 
_______________________________ 
Insert Figures 1, 2, 3 about here 
________________________________ 
All stimuli were presented on a 17” high-resolution monitor, where each image 
was presented in a portrait orientation and occupied 21 cm x 14.5 cm (non-aligned 
21 cm x 17.25 cm) against a plain white background. Viewing distance was at each 
participant’s preference. All participants used their best-corrected vision for 
inspecting the stimuli. 
 
Procedure  
Three experimental tasks were created to test the hypotheses.  
1. Full face emotion expression recognition: upright and inverted stimuli. There were 
80 different trials. The 40 photographs – 10 for each emotion – were all 
presented once upright and once inverted. The order of presentation was 
randomly assorted to prevent anticipation of next emotion response. All 
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participants were presented with the stimuli in the same order. The task was to 
correctly identify the facial emotion (anger, disgust, fear, sadness).  
2. Non-aligned composite face emotion expression recognition.   
3. Aligned composite face emotion expression recognition 
For both composite face tasks there were 96 different trials: 12 different eye-
mouth combinations of the four emotions, each upright and inverted. Each 
emotion appeared top 24 times, and bottom 24 times, and the emotion to be 
identified was top 48 times and bottom 48 times.  
People with a diagnosis of PD have bradykinaesia. As such, collection of 
reaction time responses is an inappropriate methodology for comparing performance 
of a PD with healthy controls (Bloxham, Dick, & Moore, 1987; Wearden et al., 2008). 
Our validity assessment of the testing protocol indicated that people with PD need 
more time to respond, even verbally, than given in similar tests of face emotion 
expression recognition in the literature. Equally, allowing an untimed free response 
could permit sufficient featural processing to mask any impairment in configural 
processing. We managed this situation by providing a clear response time between 
stimuli presentations. That is, in each of the three tasks, participants were presented 
with a full face or composite face for 3000 milliseconds and this was followed by an 
inter-trial interval of 3000 milliseconds. Together, this provided a 6000 milliseconds 
time window for participants to make one of the four given two-syllable verbal 
responses according to their perception of the face or composite part (i.e. “anger”, 
“disgust”, “fearful”, “sadness”). In the full-face test, the screen was blank during the 
3000 milliseconds inter-trial interval, whereas in the two composite tests, either ‘TOP’ 
or ‘BOTTOM’ was displayed in the centre of the screen to indicate which half of the 
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composite they should state “anger”, “disgust”, “fearful”, or “sadness”, according to 
their perception, in the next trial.  
As the sample size was not large enough to counterbalance three tests with 
different cognitive load, we took the view that a better approach to manage the 
between group comparisons was to use the same test order for all participants. That 
is, the full-face task was conducted first, then the non-aligned composites, and finally 
aligned composites. The sequence of the photographs in each of the three tests was 
randomised, then loosely managed to prevent multiple trials requiring the same 
response which could hide perseveration to which PD patients are prone (e.g., Lees 
& Smith, 1983). 
Testing took place in a single session in the participant’s home. The PD group 
were not asked to withhold their normal medication, and the experimenter ensured 
participants remained ‘on’ before starting each task. The three tasks were run as 
three timed presentations, as above, without pause. Rest periods between the three 
tasks were as long as required. Before each test, participants were given a practice 
set of 12 stimuli, untimed and with feedback. When participants confirmed they 
understood the procedure, formal data collection began. No feedback was given of 
performance in any of the tests.  
Verbal responses were recorded on prepared score sheets. Data were then 
entered into SPSS v25.0 database for statistical analyses. Where there were 
violations of assumptions of normality, non-parametric tests were used. As the 
analyses was restricted to a small number of planned comparisons, we followed 
advice (Armstrong, 2014; Djulbegovic et al., 2015) that Bonferroni corrections to 
alpha levels would be an overly conservative procedure. Hence, we worked with 
conventional level of significance setting alpha at .05.  




Full-face emotion expression recognition  
__________________ 
Insert Table 2 here 
__________________ 
Table 2 provides mean scores for the four emotions, according to group and 
orientation. Shapiro-Wilk tests indicated violations to assumptions of normality in 
some of the whole face data: for Anger upright and Sad upright for both groups, and 
Disgust inverted for the PD group. In view of this, non-parametric Mann-Whitney 
analyses (with one-tailed Exact significance levels) were used for whole face group 
comparisons. For upright faces the PD group exhibited impairment in recognition of 
Anger (U = 59.5; p = .002), Disgust (U = 69.0; p = .007), and Fear (U = 81.0; p = 
.023). The difference between the groups for Sadness was not statistically 
significant. For inverted faces, controls were significantly more accurate than people 
with Parkinson’s for Disgust (U = 68.0; p = .007) and Sadness (U = 73.5; p = .011).  
Paired Wilcoxon signed-ranks analyses (with 1-tailed Exact significance levels) of 
recognition of upright and inverted faces according to emotion indicated that both 
groups were significantly better in the upright orientation (see Table 2). 
A 2 (group) x 4 (emotion type) x 2 (orientation) repeated measures general 
linear model analysis confirmed small between group differences (F(1, 31) = 7.78; p < 
.009, ηp2 = .20); medium emotion type differences (F(1, 31) = 37.81; p < .009, ηp2 = 
.55); and large orientation differences (F(1, 31) = 80.80; p < .001, ηp2 = .72) across the 
whole sample. There was no group x emotion type interaction, no group x orientation 
interaction, and no group x emotion type x orientation interaction.  
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The Composite Paradigm 
Data from two tests examining face emotion expression recognition in composites 
are summarised in Table 3. The data did not violate assumptions of normality.  
___________________ 
Insert Table 3 here 
____________________ 
In the conventional upright condition, when considering the four negative 
emotion expressions together, the control group was significantly more accurate 
when composite face stimuli were not aligned than when aligned (t(1, 16) = -2.46; p = 
.026). For the PD group this composite effect was absent. Emotion specific analyses 
found no composite effect for anger, disgust or fearful for the PD group, although for 
sadness recognition was better for non-aligned composites (t(1, 15) = -2.37; p = .03). 
For the control group, a significant composite effect was found for disgust and 
fearful, but not anger or sadness.  
Examination of the inverted composite stimuli confirmed that there were no 
composite effects at all. Across every emotion and condition there was a decrement 
in performance in both groups when compared to performance when composites 
were upright.  
 
Discussion 
Our findings of a primary impairment in people with PD in recognising anger, disgust 
and fearful are largely in line with other studies which have analysed negative face 
emotion recognition separately, rather than as a single phenomenon (Arguad et al., 
2018). To examine whether a configural processing deficit was involved in these 
impairments, we employed two established tests of configural processing: inversion 
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and half-face composites. We reasoned that if impairment in face emotion 
recognition was associated with a configural processing deficit, then people with PD 
should more readily perceive the target emotion in top or bottom of an aligned 
composite ‘face’. That is, a PD group should be much less inconvenienced than 
controls when top and bottom halves of a composite are showing different emotions. 
Consistent with this prediction, our results revealed a significant overall composite 
effect for controls but not for the PD group: the controls outperformed the PD group 
with nonaligned but not with aligned composites. This outcome provides new 
evidence that the impairment in recognizing emotional expressions from faces in PD 
is associated with impaired configural processing in the context of preserved featural 
processing. 
We hypothesised that for inverted faces, there would no longer be an 
advantage for the control group, and a face inversion effect would be found in the 
control group, but not in the PD group. However, significant effects of face inversion 
were observed in both groups. Inversion effects were present with standard 
presentation of faces (Table 2), and with aligned and nonaligned facial composites 
(Table 3). Given that inversion makes it difficult to access configural information from 
a face, it might have been expected that emotion recognition would rely on featural 
processing. If so, it would have followed that the PD group would have shown a 
relatively small inversion effect and would have performed significantly worse than 
the controls with upright but not with inverted faces. These were precisely the results 
obtained by Narmé et al. (2011). However, our PD group performed significantly 
worse than controls on both upright and inverted faces and the effect of inversion 
was approximately equal in the PD sample and the controls.  
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Why might our results have differed from those reported by Narmé et al. 
(2011)? It is important to point out that their PD sample did perform significantly 
worse with inverted than with upright faces (see Table 2, Page 3298) even if this 
effect was significantly smaller than that shown by their control group. One obvious 
methodological difference is that whereas our study only examined negative 
emotions, Narmé et al. included happy faces which their PD sample recognised 
correctly as being happy faces. Moreover, performance on only one of the four 
emotions that they examined was clearly impaired in Narmé et al.’s PD group. This 
means that our study produced a more powerful between-group effect of emotion 
recognition that may have made it easier for us to detect a strong effect of inversion 
in our PD sample. It is also interesting to note that Narmé et al.’s PD group 
performed particularly well relative to controls with inverted happy and inverted fear 
faces and particularly badly with upright anger faces. Precisely why this was the 
case is unclear, other than that it is an outcome of differing demands on configural 
processing in recognising positive (happy) and negative (anger) stimuli (McKelvie, 
1995; Prkachin, 2003).  
The fact that people with PD in our study showed an effect of inversion but not 
of facial composites suggests that these two tasks are sensitive to different 
experimental variables. This outcome has important implications for our 
understanding of the types of processing that these two tasks require. How is the 
difference between the results with inverted faces and facial composites best 
understood?  
One possible explanation is that these two tasks disrupt different aspects of 
configural processing. Richler and Gauthier (2014) have pointed out that the terms 
‘configural’ processing and ‘holistic’ processing are often used synonymously, and 
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that both have been used as a blanket term for the perceptual encoding of faces. It 
has been suggested, however, (e.g. Maurer et al., 2002; Mestry, Menneer, Wenger, 
& Donnelly, 2012; Richler & Gauthier, 2014) that the perception of faces may require 
more than one type of ‘configural’ processing. According to Mestry et al., one should 
distinguish the ability to perceive a face as a whole – ‘holistic processing’ – from the 
use of second-order relations between the locations of the internal features of a face 
to recognize facial expression or identity. Holistic processing is seen as being 
responsible for the improved ability to recognize a familiar facial feature when that 
feature appears in the context of a whole face than when it appears in isolation 
(Tanaka & Simonyi, 2016). Configural processing requires sensitivity to second order 
relations between the internal features of a face that are seen as being responsible 
for identifying a familiar person (Moscovitch, Winocur, & Behrmann, 1997). 
Importantly, Maurer et al. (2002) argued that performance with facial composites is 
sensitive to the effects of holistic rather than configural processing. The absence of a 
facial composite effect in our PD group therefore provides strong evidence that in 
these terms they have a problem in processing faces holistically.  
If it is assumed that a normal inversion effect means that configural 
processing is unimpaired, then one explanation of the large inversion effect in our 
PD group is that they suffer from a holistic processing deficit but the three types of 
configural processing deficit were not equally negatively affected. That raised the 
question of whether there is any evidence to support the claim that inversion disrupts 
second order relational processing (Maurer et al., 2002). One source of 
corroboration can be seen in a study by Searcy and Bartlett (1996). They 
investigated facial emotion recognition in a series of timed comparison tasks and 
found that inversion reduced the speed of same / different responses to faces with 
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altered spatial relations significantly more than faces with distorted features (eyes 
and mouths). Their results indicated that inversion significantly disrupts the ability to 
extract second order relational information from a face. Also, holistic processing 
would appear to operate at a lower level than the detection of second order relations 
in a face, and as such, any mechanism that disrupts holistic processing would also 
impair configural processing. As Maurer et al. (2002) pointed out, no data exist to 
refute this possibility.  
There is, however, a simpler alternative explanation: the significant inversion 
effect that we observed in our PD group is consistent with them suffering from both a 
holistic and a second order relational processing deficit. Inversion may simply 
provide a less sensitive way of selectively disrupting configural processing than the 
use of face composites. As we pointed out in the Introduction, it is possible that 
some configural information can still be accessed from inverted faces (e.g. Rivest et 
al., 2009). If so, then individuals with PD would perform worse than controls if 
controls are able to access configural information from inverted faces but they 
cannot. Individuals with PD would also perform significantly worse on inverted faces 
than upright faces if inversion impairs featural processing (Psalta et al., 2014) on 
which they are particularly reliant in order to make accurate decisions about facial 
emotions.  
People with Parkinson’s disease were impaired in the recognition of the 
anger, disgust, and fearful facial emotions. The finding that people with Parkinson’s 
showed no difference in their ability to identify emotional expressions when half-face 
composites were presented aligned or non-aligned means that their problems in 
recognising facial expressions can be more readily explained in terms of a configural 
processing deficit. However, despite showing no composite effect, our PD sample 
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showed a strong inversion effect when attempting to recognise facial expressions. 
Our results therefore suggest that inversion and the use of composites disrupt face 
processing in different ways. One explanation of the finding that people with PD 
showed impaired emotional recognition even when faces were inverted is that 
inversion disrupts configural processing (detection of second order relations) 
whereas composites disrupt holistic processing (the ability to see a face as a whole). 
It is therefore possible that even though our PD sample had a holistic processing 
deficit they did not have a configural processing deficit. There is, however, a 
plausible alternative explanation. If inversion can significantly disrupt featural 
processing as well as configural processing (Psalta et al., 2014), and if some 
configural information is available to controls even when faces are inverted (Rivest et 
al., 2009), then an inversion effect would be predicted even in individuals with 
impaired configural processing. It therefore remains likely that individuals with PD 
have both a configural and a holistic processing impairment. If so, the significant 
inversion effect on facial emotion recognition that we observed in individuals with 
Parkinson’s is consistent with our original hypothesis that they rely disproportionately 
on featural processing when perceiving faces.  
The PD face emotion expression recognition literature has been challenged 
by many differences in sample selection and methodology. It could be argued that 
we have added another. However, we defend this, pointing out that we have used a 
validated set of natural faces as stimuli in a robust paradigm.  We extended stimuli 
exposure time to compensate for Parkinson’s bradykinaesia, but not at the expense 
of reducing validity. Moreover, we did not want to succumb to the same criticism 
reported in the literature of low levels of difficulty, lack of task sensitivity, and ceiling 
effects which have probably concealed deficits between Parkinson’s and controls in 
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at least six studies which did not find difference on emotion recognition (Argaud et 
al., 2018). There are also many studies where a significant difference between 
Parkinson’s and controls relies on reaction time data. A strength of our study is that 
we process validated our procedure to ensure sufficient difficulty as to avoid ceiling 
effects, and we provided enough time to avoid guessing and potentials for 
performing at chance level. Feedback from our small feasibility study led to the 
inclusion of the empty slide between stimuli for responding without compromising the 
underpinning premise that emotion expression recognition takes place quickly in the 
real world, when efficient and effective. In the test situation, it was clear that the 
experiment was challenging, but doable. 
There is also a view that neuropsychological explanations using PD samples 
may not be reliable, as impairment could be due to general cognitive deficits in the 
Parkinson’s population being studied. Nevertheless, although PD is a progressive 
disease, specific cognitive deficits can be seen in a non-demented PD sample even 
at very early stages of the disease (e.g., Hietanen & Teravainen, 1986; Lees & 
Smith, 1983), including face recognition (Cousins et al., 2000; Dewick, Hanley, 
Davies, Playfer, & Turnbull, 1991). For both these reasons, we report differences in 
Hoehn & Yahr stage in our sample, but examining differences in emotion expression 
recognition according to this disease progression classification is beyond the scope 
of this research. It is evident that there is a spectrum of cognitive impairment in the 
Parkinson’s population, ranging from no observable deficit to concomitant dementia 
(Litvan et al., 2012). Litvan et al. attempted to develop a procedure to diagnose 
Parkinson’s disease mild cognitive impairment (PD-MCI) which is purported to 
precede Parkinson’s disease dementia. However, their guidelines have been 
criticised in longitudinal studies using their diagnostic criteria for PD-MCI for being 
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poor at identifying the high risk-dementia profile as intended (Biundo, Weis, & 
Antonini, 2016). A challenge is that the heterogeneous nature of cognitive decline in 
Parkinson’s does not allow clear understanding of ‘pre-dementia’. We accept that 
controlling for potentials for pre-dementia is not straightforward: our recruitment 
method was to first screen out any potential participants with clear cognitive decline / 
PDD, then to mitigate for potential PD-MCI by matching our experimental PD sample 
with a healthy control sample on a measure of current intelligence (i.e., Mill Hill test). 
We argue that this is suitable and sufficient at this time to ensure any comparison of 
cognitive performance is valid.  
We provided a substantial test of configural processing using two paradigms 
for four negative emotions. The decision to limit the stimuli to four negative facial 
emotions, rather than including positive and neutral facial emotions could be 
construed as a limitation of the study. The rationale was based on the previous 
literature, which indicated that different emotions have different structural correlates 
(Baggio et al., 2012), and, where deficits have been found these have been limited to 
the negative emotions (Argaud et al., 2018; Péron et al., 2012; Prkachin, 2003). The 
different demand on cognitive resources of the three tests used in this paradigm 
suggested that counterbalancing the tests across participants was inappropriate, 
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Table 1. Demographics of sample 
Demographic Parkinson’s (n=16) Controls (n=17) 
Sex                         Male (%)  10 (62.5%) 8 (47.1%) 
Age (years)             Mean (SD) 
                                Range 
70.13 (10.38) 
47 – 85  
67.94 (11.31) 
54 – 88  
PD duration (years) Mean (SD) 
                           Range 
6.88 (5.19) years 
.25 – 15 years 
 







Mill Hill (max=17)   Mean (SD) 10.38 (2.09) 10.76 (2.2) 
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Table 2. Whole face emotion recognition. Mean scores, standard deviations (SD), range of scores, and Mann-Whitney Tests 
(MWU) comparing groups according to emotion type (Parkinson’s (PD; n = 16), control (C; n = 17)) and Wilcoxon signed-ranks 
analyses (Z-scores and significant p values) comparing participants according to orientation (upright (U), inverted (I)). 
 
 Anger 












(max = 10) 
Z 
p 






1 - 10 
2.25 
(1.61) 





2 – 9 
2.31 
(2.50) 





1 - 10 
5.06 
(2.67) 





0 - 10 
4.31 
(2.65) 








0 - 8 
3.12 
(1.93) 





4 - 10 
4.18 
(2.19) 





5 - 10 
5.47 
(2.96) 





0 - 10 
6.41 
(1.91) 
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Table 3. Face Composite Paradigm. Mean, standard deviation (SD), and range of 
scores according to orientation and alignment for PD patients (n = 16) and controls 
(n = 17). 
Emotion 
(max = 12)  
Group Upright  
Mean (SD)  
Inverted  
Mean (SD) 
Aligned  Non-aligned Aligned Non-aligned 
Anger PD  4.44 (2.34) 
1 – 10 
4.44 (1.97) 
1 - 7 
4.25 (2.60) 
0 – 9 
3.63 (1.89) 
1 - 7 
C  4.53 (1.81) 
2 - 8 
5.65 (2.18) 
2 - 10 
4.35 (1.80) 
1 - 9 
5.35 (2.45) 
1 - 10 
Disgust PD  3.19 (1.64) 
0 - 6 
3.19 (1.60) 
1 - 7 
2.75 (1.29) 
1 - 6 
2.31 (1.14) 
0 - 5 
C  3.59 (1.66) 
1 - 7 
4.88 (2.45) 
0 - 11 
2.71 (1.72) 
0 - 6 
2.88 (1.45) 
1 - 6 
Fearful PD  5.38 (2.09) 
1 - 10 
5.75 (2.52) 
1 - 10 
3.81 (2.32) 
0 - 8 
4.56 (2.10) 
1 - 8 
C  4.47 (2.48) 
1 - 11 
6.53 (1.74) 
4 - 10 
4.06 (2.05) 
0 - 8 
5.00 (1.66) 
2 - 8 
Sadness PD  3.31 (2.18) 
0 - 8 
4.63 (2.39) 
1 - 9 
2.50 (1.55) 
0 - 5 
2.25 (1.69) 
0 - 6 
C  4.65 (2.18) 
1 - 8 
5.06 (2.39) 
3 - 8 
3.00 (1.41) 
1 - 6 
3.65 (1.87) 
1 - 8 
Total 
(max = 48) 
PD  16.31 (4.91) 
8 - 24 
18.00 (5.09) 
9 - 26 
13.31 (4.80) 
4 - 23 
12.75 (4.36) 
5 - 21 
C  17.24 (5.38) 
10 - 28 
22.12 (5.33) 
16 - 34 
14.12 (3.90) 
7 - 22 
16.88 (4.40) 
10 - 26 
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Figure 2. Sample of upright aligned composite faces (Anger/Sadness; Fear/Disgust; 




       
Figure 3. Sample of upright non-aligned composite faces (Anger/Sadness; 
Fear/Disgust; Disgust/Anger; Sadness/Fear).  
 
 
